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Following the Middle East Peace Conference in Madrid in 1991, the Arms Control and Regional Security
(ACRS) working group was launched as the first and so far only official regional arms control
negotiations. While there have been multiple attempts to distil the lessons of the ACRS process, the
aspect of events most conducive to forging trust between the negotiators and their inter-personal
dynamics has never been explored. This paper takes an inter-disciplinary approach to studying
negotiations: it zooms in on the ACRS process, integrating Middle East studies, decision making
processes and nonproliferation literature with negotiations theory and oral history techniques, in the first
attempt at a more comprehensive methodology to one of the highlights in the modern Middle Eastern
diplomacy. To convey the multiple vantage points of participants, a three-stage methodological process is
discussed: individual interviews with negotiating team members and facilitators, followed by group
interviews of national delegations, and finally, a group session with representatives from each delegation.
Ultimately, this model helps preserve a more accurate historical account, and significantly complements
the technical insights on the negotiation dynamics with unexpected inter-personal relations angles,
assisting in the design of more promising future frameworks.
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Abstract
Following the Middle East Peace Conference in Madrid in 1991, the Arms Control and
Regional Security (ACRS) working group was launched as the first and so far only official
regional arms control negotiations. While there have been multiple attempts to distil the
lessons of the ACRS process, the aspect of events most conducive to forging trust between
the negotiators and their inter-personal dynamics has never been explored. This paper takes
an inter-disciplinary approach to studying negotiations: it zooms in on the ACRS process,
integrating Middle East studies, decision making processes and nonproliferation literature
with negotiations theory and oral history techniques, in the first attempt at a more
comprehensive methodology to one of the highlights in the modern Middle Eastern
diplomacy. To convey the multiple vantage points of participants, a three-stage
methodological process is discussed: individual interviews with negotiating team members
and facilitators, followed by group interviews of national delegations, and finally, a group
session with representatives from each delegation. Ultimately, this model helps preserve a
more accurate historical account, and significantly complements the technical insights on the
negotiation dynamics with unexpected inter-personal relations angles, assisting in the design
of more promising future frameworks.

Introduction
This paper presents a new methodological approach developed for a two-year oral
history study of the Arms Control Regional Security Working Group (ACRS), a multilateral
official negotiations track launched at the Middle East Peace Conference in Madrid in 1991.
Much of the literature on conflict studies and negotiations in general, and the long years of
the Middle East Peace Process in particular, has tended to readily accept negotiators as sterile
representatives of national interests, with scarce attention to their personal traits or
institutional background. Subsequently, this study focuses on personal perspectives of the
ACRS participants, and the impact of inter-personal and inter-institutional dynamics on the
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process. It draws on a diverse spectrum of practices of oral history, integrated with insights
from studies of negotiation behavior, offering a new methodological contribution to help
bridge the divide between different disciplines, and between theory and practice. The study
complements the prevailing approach to exploring negotiation dynamics on the state level
(which, in case of ACRS, is now relatively well understood) with additional levels of analysis
on institutional decision-making and relevant personal aspects, painting a more
comprehensive picture of these historic events. With no official record of the ACRS
negotiations, and a new generation of arms control experts yet to emerge in the Middle East,
the project, for which the methodology discussed in this paper was developed, will be able to
offer guidance for setting up more successful future frameworks for negotiating Middle East
security.
The paper starts with a brief background on the ACRS process, introducing the
methodological approach designed for this study. The second section reviews the practices in
oral history that have laid the groundwork for this methodology. The third and fourth sections
proceed to discuss the relevant theoretical frameworks in negotiation behavior and
institutional decision making processes, which are subsequently tested for explanatory power
for the ACRS case during the interviews with former negotiators. The fifth section follows
with a brief discussion of the inherent limitations of the chosen research methods, and some
of the remedies available to address them. The final section discusses preliminary findings
from the interviews conducted to date.
ACRS as a Case Study
The Arms Control Regional Security Working Group (ACRS) has so far been the
only official multilateral security dialogue and framework in the Middle East concerning
WMD control and nonproliferation. ACRS was established as part of the Arab-Israeli
multilateral peace process initiated at the Madrid Peace Conference in October 1991. The
ACRS group held six plenary sessions and many other conceptual and thematic meetings
between 1992 and 1995. By 1995, complications in the Peace Process, the 1995 Review and
Extension Conference on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation on Nuclear Weapons (NPT),
and the ongoing disagreement between Israel and Egypt over when, where, and how to
discuss the nuclear issue, all contributed to the ACRS talks being put on hold indefinitely
(Landau, 2008).
Nevertheless, ACRS achieved important understandings, including draft Declaration
of Principles and Statements of Intent on Arms Control and Regional Security, draft charter
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for regional security centers, as well as procedures for pre-notification of certain military
activities and exchange of military information. At the same time the failure of ACRS also
revealed the deep disagreements between Egypt (which took upon itself to represent the Arab
position) and Israel on priorities, the sequencing of the Peace Process versus WMDFZ
negotiations, threat perceptions, and the nuclear issue. The process also deepened mistrust
and rivalries among various Arab states (Kane & Murauskaite, 2014).
While much has been written about the ACRS process, its achievements, and reasons
for its failure, not a single study has been written by those who negotiated the process. In fact,
no account has ever been written of the decision making processes in the lead up to and
during the negotiations, or the events most conducive to the negotiations, and most helpful in
forging personal relationships and trust between the negotiators. Nevertheless, with consistent
emphasis on confidence building measures in the literature analyzing ACRS content, the role
of inter-personal dynamics, trust and good faith – or lack of thereof – held great potential
significance. Yet, with no official record of these negotiations, memories of the participants,
many of whom are already in their late seventies, are the last remaining trace of this
significant chapter in the Middle East Peace Process.
ACRS lends itself well to case study methodology, being a unique and significant
component of the Middle East Peace Process, with a less abstract content focus, a clear start
and finish date, and a relatively small and consistent group of people involved. These
specifics make it knowable in a more comprehensive manner than other aspects of the
process, or the Peace Process as a whole. Yet, many of the insights associated with
personality impact and dynamics, are still externally generalizable and have value for similar
future efforts in the region.
This is the first attempt to gather the ACRS Working Group participants’ memories,
commentaries, recollections, perspectives, interpretations, and accounts of events and
experiences during the negotiations. The broad objectives behind this approach are to better
understand what happened; offer rare insights into individuals and states’ decision-making
processes; identify differences based on cultural values and perspectives; verify or explain
contested events or decisions from multiple perspectives; transmit experiences to the future
generation of negotiators and regional policy makers; and identify areas that require special
care or consideration in future negotiations.
In this study of regional conflict negotiations, an inter-disciplinary approach was
adopted, integrating Middle East studies, decision making processes, and nonproliferation
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literature with negotiations theory and oral history techniques, in the first attempt at a more
comprehensive methodology to one of the most significant but least studied events in the
modern Middle Eastern diplomatic history.
The project was divided into three stages of interviews, complemented with personal
notes of the participants, as well as archival materials of the period in question for canvassing
a more accurate and comprehensive backdrop. In the first stage, members of the region’s
negotiating teams and facilitators were interviewed individually about their personal
experiences and roles during the negotiations, and the events that, often unwittingly, became
the pivotal points. In preparation for this stage, each interviewee was asked to write a brief,
mainly to be used to refresh the memories, as almost 20 years have passed since the discussed
events. The second stage brought together small groups of individuals, who had served
together on their state delegations, clarifying common and diverging interpretations as they
become apparent, reflective of national inter-institution dynamics. The third stage unfolds as
a joint session with one or two representatives from each delegation, where participants
collectively revisit some of the key experiences identified in the previous stages, and get to
compare notes across the national lines. This multi-layered methodological approach allows
telling the story of a particular negotiating process from multiple vantage points – the
individuals, their organizations, national delegations, and the process as a whole. The
following sections detail the body of scholarship that this methodology was built around,
explaining the aspects the model draws on, with the limitations of the chosen approach
addressed in section five.
Drawing on Oral History Practices in Conflict Studies
Oral history as a methodology can bring to light hidden aspects of a past event,
facilitating a sense of closure on issues not adequately remembered or dealt with.
Methodologically, oral history practices have been successfully applied to studying arms
control negotiations in cases of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, USA-UK
1958 Mutual Defense Agreement, the negotiations between the USA, Canada, and Romania
in the 1960s on nuclear energy cooperation, and the Cuban Missile Crisis (Blight, 2003;
Daalder & Destler, 2000; Gheorghe, 2013; Haley, 2002). With efforts to revive the Middle
East Peace Process in general, and regional arms control negotiations in particular, revisiting
the ACRS story from this innovative angle can also assist in developing recommendations
and offer insights to future negotiators. Indeed, identifying and clarifying common and
diverging interpretations of events, and helping explain the thoughts and reasons behind
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actions, is significant in moving forward, as many of these underlying realities remain
painfully acute, and individuals in question still play a central role. In preparation for this
project, the researchers consulted with three institutions that use oral history as part of their
methodology.
The USA Marine Corps (USMC) routinely uses oral history interviews to capture the
personal narratives of active duty and reserve marines recently returned from overseas
deployments, alongside the broader historical record of events that the Corps maintains. The
Marine Corps History Division has an Oral History Program dedicated for this task in
Quantico, VA, where officers are trained in this technique, and subsequently dispatched to
conduct individual interviews with their fellow marines, using a standard manual. Each
interview session is usually conducted on one-on-one basis and lasts from 45 minutes to an
hour. Shared institutional background and relatable experiences between the interviewer and
interviewee are conducive to quick development of rapport, and the interviewees tend to be
forthcoming with information, assured it would not be shared with their superiors or used in a
way that could adversely impact their stance (J. L. Rossiter, personal communication, May 1,
2013). The interviewees consent for the recorded information to be used for the Marine Corps
internally and it is rarely if ever released to the wider public verbatim, but the History
division regularly uses these insights, anonymized and pooled, in its publications.
These brief frank interactions in familiar surroundings, usually shortly after the events in
question have occurred, represent one end of the spectrum – a routine emphasizing personal
experiences in events, the significance of which is usually yet to transpire. Further down this
spectrum are oral history practices employed to study events of historic importance that have
occurred in the distant past, with the explicit purpose of preserving this record for the general
public. Parts of taped interviews from several participants are usually combined to shed light
on less known aspects of generally widely studied events. The Marine Corps Oral History
Program, for instance, used this methodology to interview the veterans of Korean and
Vietnam wars.
Another step further down this spectrum of oral history practices are extended multiday interview sessions with one individual and a team of interviewers, used by historians to
finesse details of somewhat controversial or less well-understood events that had occurred in
the distant past. In preparation for the interview, a file is assembled based on publicly
available documents, detailing the sequence of events in question (such as newspaper articles
or relevant leadership statements) to provide somewhat objective and contextualized anchors
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to the interview, and prompt the subject’s memory. For instance, scholars with the USA
Institute for Defense Analysis have used this technique to individually interview Iraqi
generals, who had served under Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War, seeking their
personal insights and the Iraqi military perspectives on the events of that period (Woods,
Murray, Holaday, & Elkhamri, 2009; Woods, Murray, Nathan, Sabara, & Venegas, 2011).
The team travelled to the Middle East to meet these veterans, usually spending around three
days with each interviewee: the first day was used to build some personal rapport, moving
through a series of increasingly detailed questions over the next day or day and a half, and
using the remainder of the third day to rehash or clarify issues raised during these
conversations. Kevin Woods (author interview, April 18, 2013, Washington, D.C.) described
these intensive sessions as physically taxing to both, the interviewers and interviewees,
requiring regular breaks to rekindle attention, and noted the challenges of communicating
through an interpreter, as well as talking across cultural boundaries (USA-Iraq; civilianmilitary; English-Arabic). The scholars have also noted that interviewees who were
physically in different places at the time of the event in question (e.g. an air force pilot and a
ground forces commander during the same battle), and thus had different but not directly
conflicting narratives, were much more forthcoming with the information, compared to those
who had lived through the experiences under scrutiny “shoulder to shoulder.”
At the other end of the spectrum is critical oral history methodology. Namely, in
mixed group interview sessions an inter-disciplinary group of scholars engages in a
moderated discussion with a group of interviewees with diverse backgrounds, who had
participated in an historical event, bringing different vantage points. The reference document
package that the interviewers prepare includes declassified documents and more personalized
records, such as letters, memos or transcripts from conversations, and the two groups interact
over several days in a series of roundtables or seminars aimed at clarifying various aspects of
the event. A representative example of employing critical oral history technique is a project
exploring the roots of USA-Iranian enmity, where a group of international relations scholars
and lead figures from the National Security Archive engaged with CIA veterans and former
USA diplomats on the subject (Blight, Lang, Banai, Byrne, & Tirman, 2012). Another
example is critical oral history series held at the Woodrow Wilson Center, such as an oral
history of the Cuban Missiles Crisis and US-South Korea relations. In the latter, fifteen
international relations scholars from the USA and the Republic of Korea (ROK), together
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with former ROK and USA officials, explore the interactions with and within the Korean
Peninsula during the Cold War (Ostermann & Person, 2011).
Building on these practices, oral history methodology was optimized for interviewing
international diplomats about their experiences during a past negotiation. Most interviewees
were Western-educated and all of them spoke English (the ACRS negotiations were
conducted in English). At the same time, whilst less constrained by language and cultural
barriers, temporal constraints was a very real issue. Given the high positions of the
interviewees (e.g. former prime minster or current foreign minister), they were able to spare
no more than a few hours at a time, after rigorous planning. Scheduling individual sessions
for 1.5-3 hours in length, and proceeding with group sessions of approximately half-day long,
offered a balanced approach in this respect. The third stage of the project, a two-day
conference based on the critical oral history model, was also designed to be shorter: with the
first two stages of interviews laying substantive groundwork, it was intended as a narrative
comparison session, instead of being the primary venue for raising the critical points.
Another challenge in arranging the interviews proved to be logistics. Namely, best
practices in oral history suggest meeting the interviewees in their familiar environment, as a
gesture promoting openness and putting them at ease. However, with most Middle East
delegates still based in the region, the tumultuous environment limited the number of
locations conducive to interview meetings for security reasons. Similarly, factors pertaining
to current regional dynamics also presented challenges in locating some of the former ACRS
participants: with 48 delegates identified through literature review and personal consultations,
it was possible to contact 20 individuals and schedule interviews with 15 of them, with more
interviews expected to follow over the next 4 months.
Prior to meeting for the initial individual sessions, the interviewees were briefed about
the project, and asked to review any personal notes or documents they may have kept from
the negotiations to rekindle the memory. Many interviewees have subsequently agreed to
share this material, and that became a significant compliment to the background
compendium, consisting of a detailed timetable of the process, source documents from the
negotiations, available media reports from the period, and scholarly literature analyzing the
process of negotiations retrospectively from the external observer point of view. For the study
of the ACRS process, this proved particularly insightful, as these negotiations, from the very
start, were conducted under the agreement that no official record would be kept. Furthermore,
the author has filed requests under the USA Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) with The
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George Bush Presidential Library, William J. Clinton Presidential Library, and the USA
Department of State, to make publicly available previously unreleased records of reports on
consultations prior and following the meetings, phone conversations, as well as relevant
notes, internal memos, reports and correspondence. Whilst the nature of these records is
somewhat USA-centric, it offers important insights into the overall dynamics of a process
that the USA was trying to facilitate, with particularly informative records of phone
conversations between USA and Middle East leaders and diplomats.
The proposed focus of the interviews on inter-personal experiences and interorganizational dynamics had initially surprised many of the ACRS delegates contacted for the
project. As discussed above, the traditional approach to studying various aspects of the
Middle East Peace Process had been primarily state-centric content-focused, with few
personal anecdotes, occasionally found in the literature, recalled when emphasizing a point
(Baker, 1995, pp. 454-455). Nonetheless, the former ACRS participants proved surprisingly
frank in the interviews, eagerly sharing their personal perspectives on the interplays among
the fellow negotiators on their team, as well as with their regional counterparts. The aspect of
inter-personal dynamics proved particularly significant, since the composition of national
teams has changed little during more than four years of the negotiating process, and the small
community of international arms control experts meant they have been interacting repeatedly
in this, as well as other forums.
Incorporating Aspects of Negotiation Behavior Studies
A common method for social scientists to test theories and models of interpersonal
conflict negotiations is through behavioral laboratory experiments with volunteers, usually
simulating situations relevant to business relations. To the best of the author’s knowledge,
none of the previous studies using oral history interviews have attempted to integrate such
insights into their methodology through question design or interview analysis. Druckman’s
(1973, 1983) research offers a rare example of sociology and behavioral research models
applied to analyze international post-conflict negotiations. Subsequently, this study looks to
bridge the gap between disciplinary methodological practices, using quantitatively tested lab
models as prompts in a qualitative study with first-hand participants of historical events.
Studies of trust in negotiations are particularly relevant: introducing regional parties to each
other through various semi-formal (Track 1.5) and informal (Track 2) initiatives, and
bringing the discourse from abstract concepts to inter-personal interactions among
counterparts, have long formed the facilitation backdrop for the Middle East Peace Process,
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with success depending in no small part on the compatibility of personalities at the table. On
inter-state level of analysis, confidence building measures have become an integral part of the
process – but ultimately, these measures also start with a network of persons, who have
confidence in their professional counterparts, and only gradually can that trust be embedded
in the states they represent.

Firstly, relevant frameworks for understand the atmosphere at the outset of the
negotiations are reviewed by Lewicki, Tomlinson and Gillespie (2006), suggesting that
parties start with surprisingly high levels of trust, absent prior information that would
encourage them to act otherwise, and gradually move towards higher levels of trust and/or
distrust, depending on their experience in repeated interactions. Meanwhile, in conflict
studies, the implicit assumption is that parties arrive at a negotiating table with mutual
feelings of animosity, i.e. that the violent conflict, ongoing or suspended for the duration of
these negotiations, would act as such prior information, negatively predisposing the parties
towards each other personally. In light of the violent conflicts in the Middle East preceding
the ACRS negotiations, and the sensitivity of the subject of weapons of mass destruction, the
interviewees were prompted to recall any prior interactions they had with their counterparts,
the first impressions, and the initial atmosphere at the working group, looking for cues about
whether and how those aspects shifted during the nearly five years of repeated encounters.
Irmer and Druckman (2009) have put Lewicki’s model of trust development to a test, using
quantitative methods to code textual inferences drawn from literature describing negotiations
processes. The qualitative approach to integrating conflict studies and sociology literature in
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this study complements the abovementioned research with first-hand accounts of participants
collected through semi-structured interviews.
Secondly, for understanding drivers of progress in negotiations, sociological studies
of conflict transformation are helpful in thinking about the points of inflection, moving the
process forward or stalling it instead. Based on Linda L. Putnam’s research review (2004,
pp. 277-278, 283), the process of negotiation can be transformed along two dimensions: first,
the level of abstraction may shift, in terms of the content of the talks, and second, the depth
and quality of the personal bond between the negotiators may change (see Figure 2).

However, it is important to appreciate that the impact of these inflection points,
signifying change in the inter-personal relations or content focus of a negotiation, can often
only be understood as productive or counterproductive in retrospect. Frank J. Barett (2004, p.
214) and Irving Seidman (2013, pp. 17-19) have also acknowledged the skepticism of many
in the field with regards to the ability of negotiators to recognize a critical moment as it
occurs – rather than retrospectively. These insights have prompted the search in this study for
the multitude of critical events throughout the ACRS process that could suggest attempts at
such process transformations, and also to prompt the interviewees directly as to whether
certain insights had occurred to them in real time or transpired in retrospect, consulting the
participants’ own notes from the period in question when available.
Thirdly, it is important to consider the impact of cultural differences on inter-personal
dynamics. It has been suggested that negotiators from diverse cultural backgrounds likely
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come to the table attaching differing levels of significance to verbal agreements (Friedman,
Yi-Hong, & Simons, 2013), and varying levels of propensity to search for win-win (as
opposed to winner-take-all) solutions (Aslani, Ramirez-Marin, Brett, Tinsley, & Weingart,
2012), potentially leading to miscommunications and overall sub-optimal results of
interaction. Behavioral studies of negotiation dynamics in business settings have also
explored the persistence and impact of cultural stereotyping (Tinsley, Turan, Weingart, &
Dillon-Merrill, 2012, pp. 272-274), and it is worth seeing how these aspects play out in
diplomatic negotiations. Cofman-Wittes (2005) has studied the interplay of cultural factors in
Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, but broader regional research in this domain remains scarce.
In case of ACRS, whilst parties from the Middle East would have been abreast of the
neighbourhood cultural and political dynamics, their limited official diplomatic interactions
may have given them little indication of how these factors play out in practice at the
negotiating table; for Western diplomats the reverse may have been the case – more direct
bilateral interactions with the parties, but less practical comprehension of regional realities on
the ground. Subsequently, the former ACRS negotiators were prompted to recall the general
level of cultural awareness amongst their colleagues and counterparts, as well as previous
experiences they may have had of cross-cultural negotiations.
It is also worth noting that few contemporary behavioral studies of negotiations
include individuals from the Middle East in their samples, with the contrasts between Asian
and North American styles of negotiation as the more common research focus. Therefore, the
insights of former ACRS participants from places like Israel, Egypt, and Jordan may offer
new perspectives to the ongoing studies and future negotiations in this field.
Inter-Agency Decision-Making Dynamics in Arms Control
Studies exploring state decisions to acquire or renounce weapons of mass destruction
frequently turn to the bureaucratic politics framework as part of the explanation, but similar
approach has so far not been applied to studying the ACRS process. The institutional factor is
important to consider, first, as a formative background influencer of the negotiators, and
second, as a systemic indicator of the different bureaucratic arrangements for handling these
arms control negotiations in participating states. Relevant models detailing organizational
behavior are drawn upon in an effort to offer a more comprehensive understanding of the
ACRS negotiations.
The literature detailing decision-making and influence over nuclear weapons issues
considers three institutional categories of particular relevance: the national nuclear energy
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establishment, significant units in the military, and the political apparatus (Sagan, 19961997). For the study of ACRS negotiations, the first category is expanded to include technical
experts from a broader range of relevant backgrounds (e.g. missile or other WMD programs),
and the third category is further divided into country leaders, foreign affairs experts, and
(lower level) civil servants. The inter-institutional dynamics came into play by socializing the
relevant groups of experts and influencers in the discourse of arms control through
educational seminars, dialogue, and identifying the agreed confidence building measures. In
addition, inclusion of persons with military background into some of the negotiating teams
created potential for civil-military institutional background clashes.
In his seminal work on institutional decision-making, Graham Allison (1971, pp. 6796) postulates that organizations follow a fixed set of actions to perform complex tasks, with
their own survival and advancement as the top priority, and are subsequently able to produce
only a limited range of responses to any given problem – inbuilt biases not always
immediately obvious to outsiders. James J. Walsh (2000) has found institutional factors to be
the most significant in explaining nuclear nonproliferation decisions, after testing a range of
alternatives pertinent to security and normative environment: modifying Allison’s classical
theory slightly, Walsh nevertheless underlines the importance of identifying the institution
that stands to gain from such a significant national policy change. However, it is not clear
whether, to set the disarmament talks (and process) in motion, the factors that have initially
driven certain institutions to become proponents of pursuing WMDs would have to be
reversed, e.g., as was the case in South Africa, or whether a rival institution would have to
emerge with goals inconsistent with such a pursuit and challenge that incumbent, as was the
case in Brazil and Argentina (for an overview of explanations of nuclear reversals, see
Mueller & Schmidt, 2010; Paul, 2000). Subsequently, during the interview process, the
author attempted to distinguish institutional level drivers of the ACRS talks, and identify
evolving institutional approaches to ACRS, in light of their traditional operating dynamics.
National government profile has also been considered among the leading explanations
of state propensity to pursue weapons of mass destruction or disarm (if one presumes the
reversal of the original drivers would allow the space for starting a dialogue on disarmament)
– with assessed characteristics being the relative depth of democratic institutional culture, and
international political and economic integration (Hymans, 2012; Solingen, 2012). These
factors significantly affect the audience costs, domestic and/or international, that the
leadership would incur in making such decisions. Regional security negotiations concerning
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the most strategic armaments arguably had the potential to start generating audience costs on
institutional level (for instance, consider Saddam Hussein’s misleading behavior regarding
Iraq’s WMD capabilities leading to the 2003 war). In addition, existing and developing
contacts between corresponding agencies of negotiating states would affect the ease with
which international influence could be exerted over domestic bureaucratic apparatus.
Furthermore, greater national inter-agency coordination necessitated by the ACRS process
around the specific set of issues at hand could potentially extend the range of such external
influence of any institution by effectively transmitting it over a newly formed domestic web
of relations, rather than being limited to a single nod of the corresponding agency. These
factors form an illustrative background for understanding the dynamics within national
ACRS delegations, explored during the second stage of interviews in this project.
Leadership susceptibility to public opinion pressure has often added complications to
the Middle East Peace Process talks, but as the ACRS talks unfolded in a separate, more
isolated domain, with negotiators several levels removed from the highly visible top
leadership, an interesting insight to consider is whether this increased the relative significance
of the institutional level traits (over personal or state level). Although country leaders still
were the ones to make the final decisions in ACRS, their involvement in the negotiating
process was rather limited (in contrast to the talks during the Peace Process), having
instructed their national negotiators in broad terms. The technical nature of discussions would
have also made it accessible to a much smaller public audience, especially given that many of
the negotiators had to be themselves gradually educated on the matter, potentially creating
more leeway by further reducing public pressure.
Another important factor to consider is the civil-military institutional dynamics. For
instance, Israel’s tradition of particularly close civil-military bureaucracies in a democratic
setting would have posed a curious challenge to the Arab state representatives, where a strong
military establishment did not typically coexist with an effective and powerful civilian
political structure - the nature of their previous domestic experience of civil-military
interaction would have been radically different. Moreover, the measures and exercises agreed
through the ACRS process would have required closer domestic cooperation between the
civil-military structures, as well as the technical experts, and it is interesting to analyze the
potential impact of ACRS to alter power relations between these domestic institutions. For
instance, Barry Posen (1984, pp. 56-75) posits that as the probability of armed conflict
declines, military structures conform more closely to predictions of organizational behavior
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theory, and also – that growing security concerns prompt increased civilian efforts of
oversight over the military establishment. Since the ACRS process was intended to gradually
improve the regional security environment, it is curious to observe whether any of these
effects on inter-agency relations could be observed as it unfolded.
Methodological Limitations and Proposed Remedies
Some of the common critiques of the interview and oral history methodologies stem
from the nature of verbal and textual information as a credible modicum. Questions surround
individual’s general ability to accurately convey their inner experiences or events they have
witnessed through a verbal exchange process of an interview (Hammersley, 2008). The
primary focus of the interviews was the personal narratives of interviewees, rather than the
search for absolute historical truths, as is characteristic for phenomenological interviewing
(Roulston, 2010, pp. 16-29). This was also helpful in addressing the challenge of accuracy
when discussing the events that occurred some twenty years earlier –a detailed timeline of
key factual events was maintained for reference purposes, but focused on memories of
emotions and perceptions, which individuals seemed to have a better recollection of.
While it was important to avoid giving the interviewees an impression that they are
being judged and ought to offer a justification for thoughts and actions they describe, the
second and third layer of group interviews were added in an attempt to qualify these
individual experiences through a collective history filter. In the second layer of national
delegation interviews, that had to be weighed against the participants’ level of comfort to
speak frankly in the presence of their former (or current) superiors and colleagues, especially
since they experienced these events together, so diverging recollections could suggest direct
confrontation. The third layer of interviews, with representatives from each delegation
brought together, presented challenges in depicting divergent perceptions within teams or
delegations – inviting particular representatives risked validating their narrative in the eyes of
fellow participants as the discussion moved ahead.
A subsequent set of concerns relates to the use of language and terminology. Namely,
the selection of language to conduct the interviews in may influence the interviewee’s speech
patterns and choice of vocabulary, as well as their interpretation. For this project, all
interviews were conducted in English – a language all participants were fluent in, but many
were not native speakers. Similarly, a cautionary note is needed for the terminology used in
this interdisciplinary research project: different academic fields tended to used different terms
to refer to the same issue at hand, and vice versa. In addition, the effort to make this project
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accessible and useful to both, academic and policy practitioner audiences also influenced the
terminology choices. Nevertheless, it must be noted that all the interviewees were from the
field of nonproliferation and shared understanding of the discussed terms.
Finally, the reliability of the interview process could be challenged on the basis of that
the interviewer, as the medium eliciting and capturing responses, influences responses as the
information requested is channeled through him or her. While this is a general concern,
following consultations about the best interview practices with other scholars, each interview
was conducted in the consistent team of two, with interviewers taking turns in leading the
question process, and taking notes independently, as well as tape recording the interviews. In
turn, some interviewees got more reserved when the conversations were taped, choosing their
words more carefully and noticeably filtering their responses, despite being promised
anonymity.
Preliminary Insights from Individual Interviews
At the time of writing, stage two of collective delegation interviews was in progress,
and the final joint session was yet to be held, but the first stage of individual interviews,
together with newly available primary source information, have already produced significant
preliminary insights, briefly discussed below.
First, the interviewees shared their insights about the personalities on their national
teams, as well as regional counterparts, with surprising frankness. With the promise of nonattribution, elaborate pictures were quickly presented of the characters that played the leading
roles throughout the ACRS process – whereas discussions of national inter-organizational
dynamics were slightly more formalized and assessments – more ambiguous. Furthermore,
the interviewees frequently pointed out the contrasting personalities of the lead Egyptian and
Israeli negotiators, and, more importantly, their contrarian inter-personal dynamics, as major
obstacles for building trust.
Second, testing the theoretical frameworks on trust building proved challenging: it
turned out that many lead ACRS participants knew each other before the process had started
from previous interactions in diplomatic forums of New York and Geneva, as well as USAIsrael Joint Political-Military Group (JPMG) and brought a certain level of trust (or rather
distrust) to the table. Indeed, it transpired that previous connections to parties in the region, as
well as belonging to the small national communities of arms control professionals, were key
to being selected to the ACRS delegations to begin with. Since the formative stage of these
inter-personal dynamics had already unfolded, the interviewees recounted few episodes
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reflective of initial bonding, instead focusing on later stages of trust development. The parties
recalled naturally gravitating towards the persons they already knew; gradually increasing the
levels of trust in these relations, whereas previously untrusted and unfamiliar parties
continued their interactions at an arms-length. Whilst such behavior of seeking comfort in
familiarity would generally hardly be surprising, the fact that this dynamic unfolded amongst
highly skilled diplomats, changing little over the course of five years was somewhat
unexpected and disconcerting. Interestingly, the bottom-up effect of trust building amongst
lower-level staff being gradually channeled up the chain of command was also hardly
discernable.
Third, with regards to cultural aspects, it was not the lack of cultural awareness, but
rather fundamental political disagreements that made it hard for the parties to connect and
trust each other. Many recalled substantial initial reservations - to even shake hands, much
less talk across the divide - which dissipated only marginally as the process unfolded.
Nevertheless, the cultural and institutional factors surfaced in the different ways that the
parties tended to (or not to) draw a line between national positions and actions in official
capacity, and personal interactions. For instance, the negotiators recalled political frustrations
exploding into personal animosities at times of heightened tension, and some felt cheated
when a fellow negotiator they felt they were getting to know on a personal level would
stubbornly stick to a national position counterproductive to the process. Overall, most
participants expressed a preference for more directness in conduct of their counterparts, even
when the content to be delivered was inevitably unpleasant.
Fourth, the interviews revealed that the USA, the leader of the process, came to it with
very limited objectives, namely, promoting a dialogue between the Arab states and Israel.
Arms control turned out to be simply one of the issues at hand, largely selected following the
recent success of the USA-USSR arms control agreement, and shred regional concerns over
WMD programs revealed in Iraq. There was a marked disconnect between the national
institutions that set the process in motion during the Madrid Conference and its implementers,
as well as diverging views – amongst the participants, and between the USA and the regional
parties, about the objectives of the process.
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